Anyone who follows ships in the Gulf has learned in 2026 that the position on the screen is a claim and may not be a fact. Tankers have been drawn at airports, bulk carriers have appeared inland, and vessels at anchor have seemed to sail in circles. This article sets out what the public record says about the scale of the problem, why every tracking service repeats the same false positions, and what a tracking system can do to tell a good position from a bad one.
The figures below come from published reporting by Windward, UKMTO and the Joint Maritime Information Center, checked on 21 November 2026. Each one is linked.
What the 2026 Figures Show
| Figure | Period | What it measures |
|---|---|---|
| About 978,000 | January to March 2026 | GPS jamming events recorded worldwide, with 98% of them in the Middle East Gulf and more than 1,100 vessels affected in the region (Windward) |
| 393 of 642 | August 2026 | Strait of Hormuz transits logged from AIS that never took place, because jamming had corrupted the positions (Windward) |
| 124,235 | July to September 2026 | Distinct vessels worldwide touched by GPS jamming, up 11.7% on the quarter before (Windward) |
| 101 warnings | Year to 28 August 2026 | Issued by UKMTO across its reporting area, with a further 13 advisories (UKMTO) |
The August figure deserves a second look. Six in ten of the crossings that a tracking screen recorded through one of the busiest straits in the world were produced by bad data. Any count, alert or report built directly on that feed inherits the error.
Why Every Tracking Service Repeats a False Position
AIS, the Automatic Identification System, is a ship broadcasting its own satellite position, along with its identity, course and speed. It was designed so that ships could see and avoid each other, and was never meant to be an independent record of where a ship is. When the satellite signal reaching the vessel is jammed or spoofed, the vessel broadcasts whatever its receiver believes, and every service that collects AIS, whether by shore station or by satellite, passes that on.
Buying a second tracking service therefore does not solve the problem, because both are relaying the same broadcast. UKMTO told mariners as early as its advisory of 1 March 2026 to note the potential for elevated electronic interference, including disruption to AIS, in the Arabian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz.
What a False Position Looks Like
On land
The vessel is drawn at an airport, in a desert or in a port it could not physically enter.
Impossible speed
A loaded tanker appears to be travelling at several hundred knots between two reports.
A sudden jump
The vessel is hundreds of miles from where it was ten minutes earlier, then jumps back.
Circles
Reports trace a neat circle in open water, a pattern that reporting on the Gulf has linked to jamming.
Silence
The vessel stops reporting for far longer than its normal interval and vanishes from the screen.
Who This Affects Beyond the Bridge
For the ship's own navigation the answer is seamanship. Industry guidance published in May 2026 by ICS, IMCA, INTERCARGO, BIMCO, INTERTANKO and OCIMF, and circulated in a JMIC advisory update, tells vessels transiting Hormuz to anticipate the loss of satellite positioning and to rely on radar and visual observation.
The harder problem is ashore, where people who cannot look out of a window make decisions from the same positions. A fleet operator deciding when to send a crew boat, an agent expecting a vessel at the pilot station, a service company watching for a client's ship and a compliance team checking where a vessel has called are all reading AIS. Reporting on the region has described ships falsely appearing to have called at ports in sanctioned jurisdictions, which turns a navigation problem into a commercial and legal one.
Six Checks a Tracking System Can Run
None of these needs specialist equipment. They are plain tests that software can apply to every position before anyone relies on it.
| Check | What it catches | What the system should do |
|---|---|---|
| Speed | A speed no ship of that type can reach | Reject the position and keep the last trusted one |
| Jump | A distance the vessel could not have covered since its last report | Flag the jump and wait for a second report |
| Land | A position on land, or in a port the vessel cannot reach | Reject it and mark the area as affected |
| Circles | Reports that trace a circle in open water | Recognise the pattern and hold back alerts from it |
| Silence | No report for longer than the vessel's normal interval | Show an estimate from the last course and speed, labelled as an estimate |
| Affected area | A position inside an area where other vessels are failing checks | Lower its trust and ask for confirmation |
Flag a bad position, never hide it
A system that quietly drops a failed report leaves a gap that nobody can explain later. A better design keeps the report, marks it as failed and gives the reason, because the next question from a client or an insurer is always what the feed said and when.
Reported and Trusted Positions
The most useful change is also the simplest. A tracking chart can show two things for each vessel in place of one: the position the feed last reported, and the last position the system trusts. When they agree there is one marker. When a report fails a check, the trusted marker stays where it is and the reported one is shown faintly beside it, with the reason it was doubted.
People then close the gap. A position confirmed by the master, the agent or a team on board is better evidence than the broadcast, and a system that lets a duty officer record that confirmation in a few seconds, with who gave it and when, ends up with a more reliable picture than any feed can supply by itself.
Common Questions
Yes, with care. Most positions are still correct, and the false ones tend to fail simple tests of speed, distance and geography. The risk lies in treating every position as equally reliable.
No. Satellite and shore-based AIS both receive the vessel's own broadcast. If the vessel's receiver has been jammed or spoofed, the false position reaches both.
Jamming blocks the satellite signal so the receiver loses its position or reports a wild one. Spoofing feeds the receiver a false signal so it reports a believable position that is wrong. From ashore, both arrive as an incorrect AIS report.
It can identify the effects with good confidence: positions on land, impossible speeds and jumps, circling patterns and clusters of vessels failing the same checks in one area.
Whoever is closest to the vessel. The master, the local agent or a team on board can confirm a position by phone or message, and that confirmation should be recorded against the vessel with its source and time.
Sources
- Windward, via Hellenic Shipping News: GPS Jamming Is Now a Mainstream Maritime Threat
- Windward: GPS Jamming in Contested Waters Demands an All-Source Operational Maritime Picture (1 November 2026)
- UKMTO Advisory 003-26, Update 002 (1 March 2026)
- UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area Overview, Report No. 4 (28 August 2026)
- Joint Maritime Information Center: Update 048 to JMIC Advisory Note (21 May 2026)
- Hellenic Shipping News: AIS spoofing and jamming in the Persian Gulf
BY BANKS designs and builds bespoke platforms for marine companies in the UAE, including vessel tracking software that checks every position before it is trusted. The wider picture is on our marine software page, and if this is a problem you are living with, get in touch.
Figures and guidance on maritime interference change quickly. Treat the linked sources as the reference and this article as a summary of them. Nothing here is navigational advice. BY BANKS is an independent software engineering company. References to Windward, UKMTO, the Joint Maritime Information Center and any other named bodies or products are descriptive only and do not imply endorsement, partnership or affiliation.
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